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333 
CRAWFORD AND BEYOND: REVISITED IN 
DIALOGUE 
INTRODUCTION 
(“It’s déjà vu all over again”* with Davis twists) 
 
Robert M. Pitler** 
This symposium issue of the Journal of Law and Policy is devoted 
to articles addressing the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause 
limitations on the admissibility of hearsay evidence. These articles 
derive in large part from papers presented and commentary given by 
their authors at a September 29, 2006 Brooklyn Law School 
conference, “Crawford and Beyond: Revisited in Dialogue.”1 As the 
program began, there was an air of déjà vu because, only a year and a 
half earlier, many of those present had attended “Crawford and 
Beyond: Exploring the Confrontation Clause in Light of Its Past.”2 
The 2005 conference focused on the landmark decision in 
Crawford v. Washington,3 which dramatically changed the Court’s  
                                                          
* YOGI BERRA, THE YOGI BOOK: I DIDN’T REALLY SAY EVERYTHING I SAID 30 
(Workman Publishing 1998). 
** Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. The author gratefully acknowledges 
the invaluable assistance of Charles Krause, research assistant David Stromes, and the 
Brooklyn Law School research and reference librarians, Rosemary Campagna, Jean 
Davis, Linda Holmes, Harold O’Grady, Jim Murphy and Vicki Szymczak. 
1 The hypotheticals considered throughout the all-day conference can be found at 
http://www.brooklaw.edu/crawford/hypotheticals. 
2 Articles and essays from the 2005 symposium were published in 71 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1–427 (2005). 
3 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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interpretation of the Confrontation Clause and its application to 
hearsay statements sought to be introduced against a criminal 
defendant. The change in approach was brought about by the 
abandonment of the Ohio v. Roberts indicia of reliability framework 
previously used to determine confrontation/hearsay issues.4  Justice 
Scalia’s opinion for the seven-justice Crawford majority found the 
Roberts reliability standard wanting because its “subjective” and 
“unpredictable” nature led to a “proven capacity” and “unpardonable 
vice” of lower courts admitting the very kinds of uncross-examined 
hearsay that the Confrontation Clause was designed to exclude.5  
According to Crawford, the Confrontation Clause requires cross-
examination of a hearsay declarant, not a judicial inquiry into the 
reliability of a hearsay statement.6 
Crawford replaced the Roberts approach with a history-based 
categorical exclusion of out-of-court “testimonial” hearsay statements 
made by “witnesses,” i.e. declarants, who do not testify at trial, 
unless the prosecution demonstrates that that witness is presently 
unavailable to testify and that the defendant had a prior opportunity to 
cross-examine the declarant.7 
The 2006 “Crawford and Beyond” conference, of course, again 
spotlighted Crawford principles—this time Davis v. Washington 
provided increased wattage.8  Justice Scalia, again writing for the 
Court, sought to refine one subcategory of testimonial 
statements⎯those obtained by police interrogation⎯and addressed 
other confrontation/hearsay issues as well. This introductory essay 
seeks to present an integrated version of Crawford-Davis confrontation  
                                                          
4 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (indicia of reliability is present if a statement is within 
a firmly rooted hearsay exception or the statement bears particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness). 
5 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63–65 (mentioning grand jury testimony, 
accomplice and conspirator plea colloquies, affidavits, and custodial confessions of 
accomplices). 
6 Id. at 61.  
7 541 U.S. at 53–54. 
8 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006). 
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principles with specific references to the articles presented in this 
Symposium.  
THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT AND HISTORY 
The Sixth Amendment provides that: “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him.”9 Guided by an 1828 dictionary, the 
Crawford majority concluded that witnesses against an accused are 
those who bear testimony, and testimony, in turn, typically means “[a] 
solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing 
or proving some fact.”10 Consequently, only the declarant of a 
“testimonial” hearsay statement is a witness within the meaning of the 
Confrontation Clause. To the majority, this definition reflected the 
main historical concern of the Confrontation Clause. 
Justice Scalia emphasized that it was English history and the 
common law that guided the Framers of the Confrontation Clause.11  
According to Crawford, the principal evil sought to be addressed by 
that Clause was the prosecution’s introduction at trial of hearsay 
statements of non-testifying declarants, obtained through private ex 
parte examinations by judicial and executive officers of the crown.  
These examinations were conducted under the “civil-law mode of 
criminal procedure,”12  the hallmark of the continental inquisitorial 
system.13  In contrast, the English common law tradition focused on 
live, in-court testimony, with the opportunity for adversarial testing.14   
 Nonetheless, Justice Scalia noted that, at times, elements of the 
civil mode of criminal procedure found their way into English practice,  
                                                          
9 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42. 
10 Id. at 51.  
11 Id. at 43.  The political, religious, social, cultural and legal cultural history of 
confrontation in England is an exceedingly rich and complex one, with a cast of 
colorful characters, memorable events and institutions thoroughly explored in 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE §§ 6341–43 at 183–346 (West Publishing Co. 1997) [hereinafter WRIGHT 
& GRAHAM]. 
12 541 U.S. at 50. 
13 Id. at 43. 
14 Id. 
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pointing to two particular settings.15  
In the notorious political treason trials of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, judicial and executive officers of the Crown 
conducted secret private ex parte examinations of suspects, co-
conspirators, accomplices, and other witnesses.16  In particular, 
throughout the Crawford opinion, reference is made to the 1603 
treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh17 at which an otherwise available 
co-conspirator, Lord Cobham, had “testified” through the introduction 
of his ex parte examination and two letters he sent to the judges 
presiding at the trial; Raleigh’s demands for Cobham to make his 
accusation in person proved futile.18 
                                                          
15 Id.  
16 See JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, 1 A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF 
ENGLAND, 325 (London, McMillan & Co. 1883). 
17 See 541 U.S. at 44, 50, 52, 62. 
18 The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, 2 COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 
AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM 
THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1783 1, 15–16, 23 (T.B. Howell ed., T.C. 
Hansard 1816) [hereinafter: HOW. ST. TR.].  It appears that torture or threats of it was 
used against other witnesses to secure oral or written statements against Raleigh.  Id. 
at 19, 22.  Unmentioned by Justice Scalia is a witness at the Raleigh trial, an ocean 
pilot named Dyer, who testified to a conversation he had in Lisbon with a Portuguese 
gentleman, who said that Raleigh and Cobham would cut the King’s throat before he 
could take the throne. 2 HOW. ST. TR. at 25.  The confrontation and hearsay 
implications of this statements is explored later in this Symposium. See Robert P. 
Mosteller, Confrontation as Criminal Procedure: Crawford’s Birth Did Not Require 
that Roberts had to Die, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 685, 712–16 (2007); see also Introduction, 
Crawford and Beyond: Exploring the Future of the Confrontation Clause in Light of 
Its Past, 71 Brook. L. Rev. 1, 8 n.28 (2005) [hereinafter Introduction]. 
Though not a lawyer, Raleigh had read the law while a prisoner in the tower 
awaiting trial.  2 How. St. Tr., supra note 18, at 16; The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, 
in 1 DAVID JARDINE, HISTORICAL CRIMINAL TRIALS 418 (1832) [hereinafter JARDINE].  
At the trial, he acquitted himself (the judges did not) quite admirably and eloquently, 
including his constant verbal jousting with Attorney General Coke, and in particular, 
his demand for Cobham’s presence and accusation to his face. See 2 How. St. Tr., 
supra note 18 at 16, 19, 22; JARDINE, supra note 18, at 420. Raleigh concluded that 
Cobham’s presence would not be required if “my accuser were dead or abroad; but he 
liveth and is in this very house.”  JARDINE, supra note 18, at 448–49.  Moreover, 
many of Raleigh’s objections to hearsay and multiple hearsay were well-framed and 
on the mark, including that all the hearsay rested on Cobham’s accusation.  See 2 
How. St. Tr., supra note 18, at 20; JARDINE, supra note 18, at 429, 430, 436. 
Raleigh’s post-conviction activities tell a fascinating fourteen-year story which is 
briefly recounted.  Introduction, supra note 18, at 8 n.9; see also 2 How. St. Tr., 
supra note 18, at 31–33, 55–59; JARDINE, supra note 18, at 476–79. 
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The civil law mode of criminal procedure was also present in the 
more ordinary, everyday criminal case, in which justices of the peace, 
under the authority of the sixteenth century Marian statutes, conducted 
pretrial release, bail and committal hearings, examining witnesses, 
accomplices and suspects.19  The examinations were reduced to 
writing and subsequently read as evidence at trial.20 
According to Justice Scalia, by 1791, when the Sixth Amendment 
was ratified, if not long before, a series of English statutory reforms 
and judicial decisions had developed a limited common law 
confrontation right.21 That right encompassed the kinds of testimonial 
hearsay statements produced by the treason prosecutions and the 
Marian preliminary examination, but no other nontestimonial hearsay 
statements.22 
The Crawford majority also briefly touched upon the use of 
controversial examination practices in the colonies and the reactions to  
them.23 Despite these American references, Justice Scalia had no  
                                                          
19 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43. Over time, the Marian examinations became ever 
more inquisitorial, sometimes even involving the use of torture, leading to a 
“dictatorship of the JPs.”  See 30 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 6342 at 229–
313. 
20 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44 (citing 2 MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 
284 (1736)). 
21 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 45–46. 
22 See id. at 44–47. But see Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know 
and When Did They Know It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 
BROOK L. REV. 105, 189–215, 120–188 (2005) (there is no historical basis for the 
testimonial/non-testimonial distinction and there was no rigid, common law cross-
examination requirement regarding Marian examinations).  Subsequently, Professor 
Davies and Robert Kry, who served as Justice Scalia’s law clerk for the October 2003 
term of the Court (during which Crawford was decided), engaged in a spirited, 
illuminating and engrossing debate over the existence of a common law right of 
confrontation with respect to Marian examinations offered at trial.  Compare Robert 
Kry, Confrontation Under the Marian Statutes: A Reply to Professor Davies, 72 
BROOK L. REV. 493 (2006), with Thomas Y. Davies, Revisiting the Fictional 
Originalism in Crawford’s Cross-examination Rule: A Reply to Mr. Kry, 72 BROOK. 
L. REV. 557 (2007). 
23 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47–49 (describing the Virginia Governor’s private 
issuance of commissions to conduct ex parte examinations of witnesses against 
particular individuals, John Adams’s condemnation of ex parte examinations during 
the Admiralty Court smuggling trial of John Hancock, and many of the revolutionary 
American declarations of rights that included confrontation provisions. For a 
comprehensive study of confrontation in America from the colonial experience to the 
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doubt that it was the English common law right of confrontation to 
which the Sixth Amendment referred.24 
The historical record supported a second proposition, stated Justice 
Scalia:  “. . . the Framers would not have allowed admission of 
testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless 
he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination.”25   
Concurring in Crawford, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by 
Justice O’Connor, remained unconvinced that the Confrontation 
Clause mandated the categorical exclusion of all solicited testimonial 
statements.26  Given that the law during the time of the Framers was 
not fully settled, the Chief Justice thought it “odd” to conclude that 
the Framers “created a cut-and-dried rule with respect to the 
admissibility of testimonial statements . . . .”27 The Chief Justice also 
emphasized that the distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial 
statements was no more based in history than the Ohio v. Roberts 
reliability framework.28 
 
*   *   * 
 
In his article, University of Tennessee Professor Thomas Y. 
                                                          
adoption of the Sixth Amendment, see WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11 § 6344 at 
348 (“. . . the history of confrontation in America was not a reflection of its history 
in England but a refraction of that history . . . . the light of English development of 
confrontation was bent as it passed through the prism of colonial experience.”). 
24 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43 (citing early American decisions reflecting the 
English confrontation right with respect to depositions); see also Mattox v. United 
States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (“We are bound to interpret the [Confrontation Clause] in 
light of the law as it existed at the time it was adopted, not as reaching out for new 
guarantees of the rights of the citizen, but as securing to every individual such as he 
already possessed as a British subject,—such as his ancestors had inherited and 
defended since the days of Magna Charta.”). But see WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 
11, § 6348 at 784 (“It is misleading if not mistaken to say that the Sixth Amendment 
was intended to adopt the common law.”). 
25 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53–54. 
26 Id. at 72. 
27 Id. at 73. 
28 Id. at 69–76.  Perhaps most important to Chief Justice Rehnquist was the long 
term uncertainty that would surely be created by this new testimonial/nontestimonial 
formula, id., and his belief that the Roberts framework was more than adequate to 
address the confrontation issues prescribed in Crawford.  Id. at 75–76. 
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Davies concludes that Framing-Era authorities indicate that the 
introduction of unsworn hearsay statements violated basic principles of 
common-law criminal evidence, based in turn on the confrontation 
right.29 Accordingly, Crawford’s testimonial/nontestimonial 
formulation “does not reflect the Framers’ design,”30 and permitting 
the introduction of “nontestimonial” hearsay is “inconsistent with the 
basic premises that shaped the Framer’s understanding of the right.”31  
According to Professor Davies, only two kinds of out-of-court 
statements were admissible: a sworn statement of an unavailable 
witness32 and a dying declaration—the functional equivalent of a sworn 
statement.33  After analyzing the historical cases discussed in Davis 
and Crawford, Professor Davies concludes that neither decision 
identified a single example of a Framing-Era case that admitted 
unsworn hearsay against a criminal defendant.34  
In his article, New York Law School Professor Randolph N. 
Jonakait observes that if Framing-Era views (including those shortly 
after the Framing) are to control the meaning of the Confrontation 
Clause, it is “American views from that era that are most important,  
and the best sources of American viewpoints and ideas are American 
cases, not English cases.”35 Professor Jonakait proceeds to examine 
extensively two early American cases,36 concluding that the American 
courts of the Framing Era enforced a general ban on hearsay as being 
“no testimony”37 and recognized very few hearsay exceptions.38 
Moreover, Professor Jonakait points out that nothing in the  
                                                          
29 Thomas Y. Davies, Not the Framer’s Design: How the Framing-Era Ban 
Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis “Testimonial” Formulation of 
the Scope of the Original Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 349, 352 (2007). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 354. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 448. 
35 Randolph N. Jonakait, The (Futile) Search for a Common Law Right of 
Confrontation: Beyond Brasier’s Irrelevance to (Perhaps) Relevant American Cases, 
15 J.L. & POL’Y 471, 473 (2007). 
36 Id. at 478–83, 484–93. 
 37 Id. at 491. 
38 Id. at 493. 
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Framing-Era cases reflects Crawford’s testimonial/nontestimonial 
distinction.39 Professor Jonakait acknowledges that the early American 
cases do not speak directly to the right of confrontation,40 but the 
cases he cites directly show the Framing Era’s judicial concern about 
the use of out-of-court statements in a criminal case and the general 
bar to their admissibility.41 
TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS 
Crawford did not articulate an overarching definition of 
“testimonial,” leaving that “for another day.”42  The majority simply 
noted that, at a minimum, the category included testimony before the 
grand jury, or prior trial or preliminary hearing testimony, and 
statements produced by police interrogations—the “modern practices 
with closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause 
was directed.”43 Davis, like Crawford, did not provide a 
comprehensive definition of “testimonial.” 
The category of testimonial statements is not limited to those 
mentioned in Crawford.44 Indeed, looking to an old, non-modern 
practice, Davis added to the testimonial list volunteered accusatory 
statements to the government.45 Significantly, testimonial statements of  
                                                          
39 Id. at 491 (noting a trial court’s statement that if a private journal of a 
defendant were produced, it would be admissible against its author but not against any 
other defendant). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 75. 
43 Id. at 68.  
44 See id; Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2273 (2006). Curiously, the 
Crawford opinion omitted affidavits and plea allocutions from the testimonial 
category, even though they were mentioned earlier in the opinion as being testimonial. 
541 U.S. at 68. Subsequently in Davis, the Court recognized the testimonial nature of 
an affidavit, 126 S.Ct. at 2280, and other courts have had no difficulty holding plea 
colloquies testimonial. See, e.g., United States v. McClain, 377 F.3d 219, 222 (2d 
Cir. 2004). 
45 Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2274, n.1 (“The Framers were no more willing to exempt 
from cross-examination volunteered testimony . . . than they were to exempt answers 
to detailed interrogation.” Also noting that Lord Cobham’s letter to the commission at 
Raleigh’s trial was plainly not the product of sustained questioning). Still, Cobham 
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this kind are certainly not produced by the kind of ex parte 
examination or abuse at which the Confrontation Clause is primarily, 
but, as the Court made clear, not exclusively, directed.46 
A. Statements Elicited By Police Interrogation 
To the Crawford and Davies majority, “[p]olice interrogations 
bear a striking resemblance to examinations by justices of the peace in 
England.”47  Despite the resemblance language, Davis makes clear 
that “[r]estricting the Confrontation Clause to the precise forms 
against which it was originally directed is a recipe for its 
extinction.”48  The Crawford majority observed that, like the 
testimonial category of statements, the subcategory of police 
interrogation-produced statements has many possible definitions. Still, 
no further definition was required because Sylvia Crawford’s 
recorded (Miranda-warned) statement, knowingly given in response to  
                                                          
was a prisoner when he wrote the letter, and the details of how it came to be written 
are nowhere set forth except that at trial, one commissioner stated the letter was 
voluntary “and not extracted from the Lord Cobham upon any hopes of promise or 
pardon.” 2 HOW. ST. TR., supra note 18, at 29.  In addition to a letter, a volunteered 
statement could take the form of an affidavit, an in-person oral statement, an audio or 
video recording.  See Hammon v. Indiana, No. 05-5705, Oral Argument, Mar. 20, 
2006, 32–37 (comments and questions of Justices Scalia, Souter and Chief Justice 
Roberts); see also State v. Jensen, 727 N.W.2d 518, 527–28, 528–29 (Wis. 2007) 
(holding testimonial both voice-mail messages to police by victim that defendant was 
trying to kill her, and statements in the victim’s letter given to a neighbor with 
instructions to turn it over to the police if anything happened to her). 
46 Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2279 n.6 (“Police investigations themselves are, of 
course, in no way impugned by our characterization of their fruits as testimonial.  
Investigations of past crimes prevent future harms and lead to necessary arrests.” Cf. 
Oral Argument in Hammon v. Indiana, No. 05-5705 at 32 (corruption of a statement 
by interrogation or other abuse was not the only concern of the Founders who “I think 
believed in a judicial system, at least in criminal cases, where the person has the right 
to cross-examine his accuser.” (Remarks of Scalia, J.).  Id. at 33 (One of the 
concerns of the Confrontation Clause is witnesses who have a motive to frame the 
defendant and do so even though there is no police abuse in securing the statement) 
(Remarks of Kennedy, J.). Still Davis, leaves that the Confrontation Clause is only 
offended by “the trial use of, not the investigatory collection of, ex parte testimonial 
statements.”  126 S.Ct. at 2279 n.6. 
47 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52; see also Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2278. 
48 126 S.Ct. at 2278 n.5. 
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structured police questioning, would have qualified under any 
conceivable definition.49  
Subsequently, in Davis, Justice Scalia shifted focus from “police 
interrogations” to interrogations by “law enforcement officers,”50 
observing that the Crawford Court “. . . had immediately in mind . . . 
interrogations solely directed at establishing the facts of a past crime, 
in order to identify . . . the perpetrator.” Justice Scalia continued, 
“[t]he product of such interrogation, whether reduced to a writing 
signed by the declarant or embedded in the memory . . . of the 
interrogating officer, is testimonial.”51 
As noted, Davis, like Crawford, did not provide a comprehensive 
definition of testimonial, but it did further refine the meaning of police 
interrogation in two distinct settings, cautioning that its holding was 
limited to deciding Hammon and Davis.52 
 
i) Statements are testimonial when the circumstances objectively 
indicate that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or 
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution, 
and the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no ongoing 
emergency to justify the interrogation.53 
 
Responding to a domestic disturbance, the police went to the 
private home of Amy and Herschel Hammon where they encountered  
                                                          
49 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4.  The use of “knowingly” implies that the 
declarant must know that he or she is speaking to law enforcement.  See also Davis, 
126 S.Ct. at 2275 (indicating the nontestimonial nature of statements made unwittingly 
to a government informant) (citing Bourjailly v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181–84 
[1987]); see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 (same). The Court, however, has never 
expressly held that there is such a requirement, and the issue remains open. 
50 Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2274. 
51 Id. at 2276 (“. . . we do not think it conceivable that the protections of the 
Confrontation Clause can readily be evaded by having a note-taking policeman recite 
the unsworn hearsay testimony of the declarant, instead of having the declarant sign a 
deposition.”) (emphasis in original). 
52 Id. at 2273 (“[We are not] attempting to produce an exhaustive classification 
of all conceivable statements—or even all conceivable statements in response to police 
interrogations—as either testimonial or nontestimonial . . . .”); see also id.  at 2278 
n.5 (repeating a similar caution limiting the holdings to a resolution of the “cases 
before us and those like them.”). 
53 Id. at 2273–74. 
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a calm domestic setting with no apparent emergency. After an initial 
police inquiry, speaking with the husband and then separating him 
from his wife, and following some prompting and prodding, Amy 
Hammon described her husband’s assault which had apparently 
provoked the domestic disturbance call. Justice Scalia, for the 
majority, noted that during this questioning, the officer was no longer 
seeking to determine “what is happening” but rather, “what 
happened.”54  This questioning was testimonial in nature because 
“[o]bjectively viewed, the primary, if not indeed the sole, purpose of 
the interrogation was to investigate a possible crime . . . .”55 
Like the custodial questions and answers in Crawford, Ms. 
Hammon’s statements deliberately recounted, in response to police 
questioning, how past, potentially criminal, events began and 
progressed, and the questioning took place soon after the described 
events transpired. To the Court, “[s]uch statements under official 
interrogation are an obvious substitute for live testimony, because they 
do precisely what a witness does on direct examination; they are 
inherently testimonial.”56  Put another way, “the evidentiary products 
of the ex parte communications [of Amy Hammon and Sylvia 
Crawford] aligned perfectly with their courtroom analogues.”57  
Notably, the Davis majority rejected a more flexible approach to the 
introduction of interrogation-produced statements in a domestic 
violence setting,58 reflecting its general view that “[t]he text of the 
Sixth Amendment does not suggest any open-ended exceptions from  
                                                          
54 Id. at 2278. 
55 Id.  Justice Thomas dissented in Hammon and summed up his numerous 
concerns by observing that the unpredictable primary purpose standard  adopted by 
the Court was neither “workable, nor a targeted attempt to reach the abuses forbidden 
by the [Confrontation] Clause.”  See 126 S.Ct. at 2281–85.  Justice Scalia responded 
that the Court’s approach was still a work in progress and, for the cases decided, the 
test is objective and quite workable. Id. at 2285.  Moreover, observed Justice Scalia, 
the dissent had proposed nothing remotely workable other than a vague distinction 
between “formal” and “informal” statements which was but a mere form of words.  
Id. 
56 Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2278 (emphasis in original). 
57 Id. at 2277. 
58 Id. at 2279–80. 
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the confrontation requirement to be developed by the courts.”59 
 
*   *   * 
 
In her article, University of Maine Professor Deborah 
Tuerkheimer views the Davis Court’s focus on description of past 
events as inappropriate in domestic violence settings because the 
nature of domestic violence is not episodic.60  Put simply, the 
“continuing” nature of domestic violence does not lend itself to the 
Court’s “binary” framework in which declarants either “cry for help” 
or “provide information.”61 Professor Tuerkheimer argues that in 
domestic violence cases, a battered woman must often provide 
information regarding “past events” and past violence in order to 
prevent imminent violence.62  Whether an emergency exists, in such 
cases, cannot be determined without an understanding of the context of 
domestic violence cases; therefore, emergency and past abuse are 
inextricably intertwined such that domestic violence victims cannot 
seek help without describing the past events.63  In Professor 
Tuerkheimer’s judgment, the Court’s testimonial characterization of 
statements describing past events, will, in the domestic violence 
context, result in exclusion of statements that are, in fact, cries for 
help.64 
 
ii) “Statements are nontestimonial [for purposes of the 
Confrontation Clause] when made in the course of police interrogation 
under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of 
the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 
emergency.”65 
 
Davis involved a 911 call and plea for help while the caller  
                                                          
59 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004). 
60 Deborah Tuerkheimer, A Relational Approach to the Right of Confrontation 
and its Loss, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 725, 737 (2007). 
61 Id. at 733 n.21. 
62 Id. at 732. 
63 Id. at 732–33. 
64 Id. at 728, 735–36. 
65 Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2268–69. 
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(Michelle McCottry) was being assaulted by her former boyfriend, 
Adrian Davis. Once she began talking to the 911 operator, Davis fled 
and, as he was fleeing, Ms. McCottry identified Davis by name in  
response to the operator’s inquiry. 
Characterizing the 911 call as a cry for help and viewing the 
circumstances objectively, the Court recognized that Ms. McCottry 
“simply was not acting as a witness; she was not testifying.”66  What 
she said was not a “weaker substitute for live testimony” at trial;67 
rather, this was an emergency call for police assistance against a bona  
fide physical threat68 that, in relevant part, described the offense as it 
was occurring. Objectively viewed, the primary purpose of the 911 
operator’s questions and the information provided by the caller was to 
secure police assistance to an ongoing emergency, not to prove or 
establish past events.69 
The opinion seemingly recognized that the statements Ms. 
McCottry made after the emergency had subsided—when Davis had 
fled—were testimonial and should be redacted.70 Still, as Ms. 
McCottry reported Davis’ flight, the operator asked a nontestimonial 
question to secure the identity of the assailant so that the dispatched 
officers would know whether they may encounter a violent individual, 
and Ms. McCottry gave a nontestimonial response in naming Davis.71 
For the purposes of the Davis opinion, the Court assumed in a 
footnote (but did not decide) that questioning by 911 operators were 
acts of the police.72 That same footnote goes on to state that, like 
Crawford, the holding in Davis makes it “unnecessary to consider 
whether and when statements made to someone other than law 
enforcement personnel are ‘testimonial.’”73 
 
*   *   * 
                                                          
66 Id. at 2277 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 2276.  The emphasis on the statement as describing ongoing events is 
not captured by the Court’s holding.  See 126 S.Ct. at 2288, set forth at note 53, 
supra. 
69 Id.  
70  Id. at 2277. 
71 Id. at 2276. 
72 Id. at 2274 n.2. 
73 Id. 
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In “Crawford, Davis and Way Beyond,” University of Michigan 
Law School Professor, Richard Friedman, a leading confrontation 
scholar who represented Hammon before the Supreme Court, finds the 
primary purpose of both the interrogator and the witness to whom 
he/she is speaking ill-suited to define a testimonial police 
interrogation.74  He so concludes because determining primary purpose  
is quite difficult since the interrogator often has more than one 
purpose, and the multiple purposes may be inextricably intertwined.75  
Thus, after-the-fact labeling of one purpose as primary is an arbitrary 
exercise which invites judicial manipulation to ensure that the 
statement will be held admissible.76 
Professor Friedman rhetorically inquires why the existence of 
police interrogation should turn on the purpose of the interrogator 
when, as he has argued at length, it is the witness’s perspective that 
should be controlling.77  Moreover, he points out that the Davis Court 
recognized as much when it observed: “And of course, even when 
interrogation exists . . . it is in the final analysis the declarant’s 
statements not the interrogator’s questions that the Confrontation 
Clause requires us to evaluate.”78  Thus, concludes Professor 
Friedman, Davis is perfectly compatible with his approach, which 
focuses on anticipation of the statement’s prosecutorial use from the 
perspective of a hypothetical reasonable person possessing all of and 
only the information known to the declarant at the time of 
questioning.79  He concludes that his approach would be less prone to 
manipulation by the prosecution-favoring lower courts80 and that 
nothing in the hypothetical reasonable person approach is in any way 
inconsistent with Davis.81 
                                                          
74 Richard Friedman, Crawford, Davis and Way Beyond, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 553, 
559 (2007). 
75 Id. at 559–60. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 560. See Richard Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of 
“Testimonial,” 71 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 255-59 (2005). 
78 Friedman, supra note 74 at 560–61 (citing Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2274 n.1). 
79 Id. at 561–63. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 572. 
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Professor Friedman is also concerned that the ambiguity in the 
terms “primary purpose” and “ongoing emergency,” along with the 
manner in which the Court applied them in Hammon and Davis, will 
encourage judges to manipulate the Crawford-Davis framework to 
admit accusatory statements in much the same fashion as did the 
discarded Roberts standard.82 Nevertheless, he expresses the hope that 
manipulation will be limited by the Davis requirement that the witness 
must be describing events as they are actually happening.83 
In her article, Southwestern Law School Professor Myrna Raeder 
finds that the “primary purpose of the interrogation” approach is 
almost as arbitrary as the discarded Roberts reliability framework. 84  
Professor Raeder is also concerned that the Court’s objective standard 
could be manipulated to mask improper motives by of law 
enforcement officials.85 
In his article, Stanford University Law School Professor Jeffrey 
Fisher, who represented Crawford and Davis before coming to 
academia, views “the emergency/non-emergency dichotomy [as] the 
wrong touchtone to resolve disputes about statements describing fresh 
criminal activity.”86  Additionally, Professor Fisher thinks that there is 
very little, if any, relevance in resolving the testimonial issue by 
focusing on the primary purpose of the interrogation.87  At least in 
scenarios not dealing with police interrogation, he is doubtful about 
the soundness of the reasonable person test because it could easily lead 
to inconsistent results and is too easily judicially manipulable.88 
Turning to other features of Davis, Professor Fisher proposes a 
two-prong framework for assessing the testimonial nature of 
statements to police officers describing recent criminal events. First, 
he looks to the common law evidentiary res gestae doctrine that  
                                                          
82 Id. at 563. 
83 Id. at 563–64. 
84 Myrna Raeder, Domestic Violence Cases After Davis: Is the Glass Half Empty 
or Half Full?, 15 J.L. & POLY 759, 775-76 (2007). 
85 Id. at 777. 
86 Jeffrey Fisher, What Happened and What is Happening to the Confrontation 
Clause?, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 587, 590 (2007). 
87 Id. at 617–18. 
88 Id. 
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encompasses statements describing ongoing activity89 as well as 
statements “made immediately thereafter in direct consequence to 
these occurrences but excluding descriptions of completely past 
occurrences.”90 The second prong calls for a determination of 
whether, in making the statement in question, the declarant is doing 
precisely what a witness does at trial:91 answering questions rather 
than volunteering statements to an official.92  Professor Fisher then 
proceeds to apply this framework to settings beyond fresh accusations 
to police officers, including statements to private victims’ service 
organizations, medical personnel, and victims’ parents.93 
In his article, University of Nebraska Law Professor Roger Kirst 
examines the decisions in Davis and Hammon to articulate practical 
rules to guide day-to-day judicial decision making in the real world.94  
Professor Kirst explains that the different outcomes in Davis and 
Hammon turn on whether the speaker was facing an ongoing 
emergency when she spoke.95  Thus, to Professor Kirst, it is crucial to 
determine what constitutes the end of an emergency.  He notes that 
different kinds of emergencies, e.g. seeking medical care or 
prevention of a threatened or ongoing assault,96 as well as the identity 
of the declarant, e.g. victim or bystander,97 may, though not 
necessarily, require different modes of analysis. For further guidance, 
Professor Kirst then examines cases in which certiorari was denied or 
in which the writ was granted, the judgment vacated, and the case  
                                                          
89 Id. at 590. 
90 Id. at 608–09. (“Only the res gestae concept was developed in order to 
interlock with constitutional restrictions respecting the introduction of out-of-court 
testimony against criminal defendants.”). For a modern day return to traditional “res 
gestae” evidentiary principle to address Crawford’s Confrontation Clause concern 
about spontaneous statements (541 U.S. at 58, n.8), see State v. Branch, 865 A.2d 
673, 690-91 (N.J. 2005). 
91 Fisher, supra note 86, at 614–16. 
92 Id. at 616. 
93 Id. at 616–26. 
94 Roger Kirst, Confrontation Rules after Davis v. Washington, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 
635, 636 (2007). 
95 Id. at 641–44. 
96 Id. at 644. 
97 Id. 
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remanded in light of Davis.98 
He then restates Davis as rules,99 and looks at the cases on remand 
and other post-Davis decisions to assess Davis in a variety of factual 
settings.100  Professor Kirst concludes by examining Davis in the 
context of overall confrontation doctrine.101 
Professor Myrna Raeder concludes that the so-called bright line 
“primary purpose test” has and will continue to prove difficult to 
apply, creating special problems and uncertainties in domestic violence 
cases.102  In her view, “primary purpose” gives little guidance to 
lower courts in determining what qualifies as an ongoing emergency 
and whether the statement helps to resolve it.103 Consequently, the 
lack of guidance has led to an overbroad and inconsistent 
interpretation of what qualifies as an emergency.104 Profesor Raeder 
believes that whether there is an ongoing emergency may well and 
unacceptedly turn on whether the 911 operator asks questions in the 
present or past tense.105  She further notes that many decisions 
seemingly hinge on whether the defendant is still at home, while 
others indicate that the emergency is not over if the defendant could 
return.106  These results, she argues, fail to follow the “Supreme 
Court’s narrow view of context in assessing whether an emergency 
existed in Hammon.”107 
 
  
                                                          
98 Id. at 644–62. 
99 Id. at 662–63. 
100 Id. at 644–77. 
101 Id. at 677–83. 
102 Raeder, supra note 84, at 788–89. 
103 Id. at 764. 
104 Id. at 766–67. 
105 Id. at 765. 
106 Id. at 771. 
107 Id. 
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Testimonial Statements to Private Persons 
 
All of the statements at issue in Crawford and Davis were made to 
the government. Certainly it is reasonable to read the two cases as 
requiring government involvement in the making of the statements, if 
only as a passive recipient it—at least until the Court holds otherwise.  
Nonetheless, Davis cited a case that arguably raises a question about 
the need for governmental involvement.  
According to the majority opinion, relying on common law 
English cases, Davis sought “to cast McCottry in the unlikely role of 
a witness.”108  Justice Scalia quickly noted that none of the cited cases 
involved statements made during an ongoing emergency.109  He then 
gave as an example King v. Brasier,110 in which a five year-old girl, 
Mary Harris, immediately on her returning home, described the 
circumstances of a sexual assault to her mother and a woman lodger in 
their home.111 The next day, the five year-old, accompanied by her 
mother, went to the defendant’s lodgings, where she identified him.112  
The statements were subsequently held inadmissible, and Justice Scalia 
observed that Brasier would be helpful to Davis “if the relevant 
statement had been the girl’s screams for aid as she was being chased 
by her assailant; however, by the time the victim got home, her story 
was an account of past events.”113 
In his article,114 Professor Richard Friedman posits that Justice 
Scalia, in distinguishing Brasier, “[appeared] to endorse it” as 
involving a testimonial statement, even though that the statement was 
not made to a law enforcement officer.115  Indeed, Professor Friedman 
contends that Brasier had itself referred to the five year-old’s 
accusation as testimony,116 and Professor Jeffrey Fisher agrees.117   
                                                          
108 Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2277 (2006). 
109 Id. 
110 1 Leach 199, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (1779). 
111 Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2277. 
112  168 Eng.Rep. 202 (1779). 
113 Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2277. 
114 Friedman, supra note 74, at 564. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 564–65 n.43. 
117 Fisher, supra note 86, at 593. See also Robert B. Mosteller, Testing the 
Testimonial Concept, and Exceptions to Confrontation: “A Little Child Shall Lead 
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Moreover, according to Professor Friedman: “Brasier made no 
new law . . . rather its significance is that it reflects the common 
understanding . . . at the time . . . of the framing of the Sixth 
Amendment that an out-of-court accusation, even one made very soon 
after the event, was testimonial in nature and therefore not 
admissible.”118 He continues that “such a deeply seated understanding 
of the confrontation right should be given considerable weight in 
determining the Clause’s modern meaning.”119 
In contrast to the Friedman-Fisher view, Professor Thomas Davies 
points to the reporting of the rulings in Brasier as illustrating the 
dangers of working with reports of English criminal trials from the 
late eighteenth century.120  Professor Davies asserts that the 1815 
version of Brasier, relied upon by the Petitioners’ briefs and opinion 
in Davis, was very different from the original report published in 
1789.121  That original report indicated that Brasier was convicted on 
the unsworn testimony of the five year-old girl who testified at trial, 
and the issue was resolved in the defendant’s favor because unsworn 
testimony could not be received at trial.  There was, however, neither 
mention of the child’s statements to the mother and lodger,122 nor of 
the error in receiving them into evidence. 
Professor Davies concludes that it was not until well after the 
framing that the later version of Brasier could have come, if it ever 
did, to the attention of the Framers.123  Professor Davies rejects the 
idea that the later version of Brasier and its purported testimonial 
language could be relied upon to show the English practice during the 
Framing Era.124 He does so because, as far as the Framers could have  
                                                          
Them,” 82 IND. L.J. 909, 927 (2007) (the child’s statement to her mother was 
testimony and could not be received because the child was not under oath). 
 118  Friedman, supra note 74, at 565. 
119 Id. 
120 Davies, supra note 29, at 428. 
121 Id. at 438–41.  In addition, to the 1789 and 1815 reports of Brasier, there 
was also an 1800 footnote to the 1789 report and an 1806 report of the case in a 
treatise that made mention of the child’s statements. For a discussion of the several 
reports of Brasier, see Mosteller, supra note 117, at 927–31. 
122 See Davies, supra note 29, at 438–39 n.217. 
123 Id. at 438–39. 
124 Id. at 465. 
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known, “the issue of what could constitute admissible evidence in the 
case of a child rape victim who was too young to be sworn, was 
understood to be a uniquely difficult and unsettled question.”125   
Finally, Professor Davies views the 1815 version of Brasier, 
regarding the mother’s statements, as having neither said nor implied 
anything about the distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial 
evidence.126  Rather, he concludes that the later version of the Brasier 
decision “simply restated the same blanket exclusion of unsworn 
hearsay evidence that was also set out by the treatises and manuals of 
the time.”127 
Professor Randolph Jonakait concludes that Brasier reflects 
nothing more than the principle “that out-of-court statements from an 
incompetent witness could not be admitted in a criminal trial.”128  
Moreover, “[Brasier] says nothing about the hearsay rule generally, 
hearsay exceptions or the right of confrontation”;129 it takes “a highly 
creative, and perhaps a highly anachronistic eye to find a 
confrontation meaning in Brasier.”130 
Finally, on the meaning of Brasier, Anthony Franze, a co-author 
of an amicus brief on behalf of the National Association of Counsel 
for Children in Davis v. Washington, offers a slightly different 
perspective in his Symposium article.131  Mr. Franze reviews the 
common law before and after Brasier, as well as treatises and 
subsequent cases to see the meaning given to Brasier following its 
publication. From this, he concludes that Brasier has no place in 
confrontation doctrine.132 
                                                          
125 Id. at 444. 
126 Id. at 443–44. 
127 Id. at 444. 
128 Jonakait, supra note 35, at 474–77. 
129 Id. at 472. 
130 Id. at 474; see also Mosteller, supra note 117 at 931 (Brasier “played no 
direct role in shaping confrontation because the Framers could not possibly have 
known about it as a hearsay/confrontation case, and it therefore could not have 
affected their thinking. . . . The [Brasier] judges gave no indication of being 
concerned as to whether the statement was testimonial, nor do they take note of any of 
the circumstances that . . . might lead to treating the statement as testimonial.”). 
131 Anthony Franze, The Confrontation Clause and Originialism’s Lessons from 
King v. Brasier, 15 J.L. & POL’Y at 495 (2007). 
132 Id. at 508–09. 
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Mr. Franze further reasons that it is unlikely the Framers would 
have been aware of any version of Brasier and, in light of “the legal 
authorities that were available in Framing-Era America, they [well 
could] have understood that hearsay accounts by parents, doctors and 
acquaintances concerning statements made by child sex abuse victims 
would be admissible in criminal trials without regard to whether the 
statements would now be considered ‘testimonial’ or ‘non 
testimonial.’”133  Finally, Mr. Franze argues that Brasier demonstrates 
some of the practical limitations of originalism as an interpretative 
construct for constitutional criminal procedure decisions.134 
Formality 
In Crawford the Court describes testimonial statements as being 
formal135 and solemn136 in nature. The structured, tape-recorded 
custodial interrogation of Sylvia Crawford following a Miranda 
warning was apparently formal enough for the seven-justice majority 
in Crawford,137 and a unanimous Court in Hammon agreed.138 To be 
sure, the Crawford interrogation was more formal than the in-home 
interrogation of Amy Hammon.  Still, “[i]t was formal enough that 
Amy [Hammon]’s interrogation was conducted in a separate room, 
away from her husband (who tried to intervene), with the officer 
receiving her replies for use in his investigat[ion].”139  To the Davis 
majority, “[t]he solemnity of even an oral declaration of relevant past 
fact to an investigating officer is well enough established by the severe  
                                                          
133 Id. at 500. 
134 Id. at 500–02. 
135 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 38, 51–52 (2004). 
136 Id. 
137 See id. at 53 n.4, 61, 65 (the opinion never expressly characterizes the 
statement as formal, though its descriptions imply that characterization, as does its 
recognition that the statement is testimonial, whatever the definition). 
138 Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2278 (2006) (Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justice Alito, who had replaced the Crawford concurrers, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice O’Connor, joined the Davis majority, and Justice Thomas also agreed that 
Sylvia Crawford’s Miranda-warned custodial statement was testimonial in nature). 
139 Id. at 2278. 
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[criminal] consequences that can attend a deliberate falsehood.”140  
Finally, Davis contrasts the calm and tranquil interrogations of 
Hammon and Crawford to the frantic statements of McCottry in Davis, 
in an environment that was neither tranquil nor safe.141 
In dissent, Justice Thomas argued that a living room conversation 
with a police officer hardly bears the formality or solemnity of 
formalized testimonial materials or, for that matter, the solemnity 
present during the police interrogation of a person, i.e. Sylvia 
Crawford, following a warning that anything said can be used against 
him or her in a court of law.142 
Mr. Justice Scalia responded to Justice Thomas: “We do not 
dispute that formality is indeed essential to testimonial utterance. But 
we no longer have examining Marian magistrates; and we do have, as 
our 18th-century forebears did not, examining police officers–who 
perform investigative and testimonial functions once performed by 
examining Marian magistrates.”  Justice Scalia concluded: “It imports 
sufficient formality, in our view, that lies to [police] officers are 
criminal offenses.”143 Notably, Justice Scalia nowhere suggests that 
the person being interrogated need even be aware that lying to a police 
officer is a criminal offense, and if the declarant is unaware of the 
status of the person to whom he or she is speaking, then there is no 
crime.144 
The Hammon holding and the Scalia-Thomas exchange denote 
a malleable formality requirement, at least with respect  to  police  
                                                          
140  Id. at 2276; see also id. at 2279, n.5 (“It imports sufficient formality, in our 
view that lies to such officers are criminal offenses.”). But see Robert P. Mosteller, 
Softening the Formality and formalism of the Testimonial Concept, 19 REGENT L. 
REV. 429, 441 n.55, 442 n.57 (2007) (“these statutes [making it unlawful to lie to the 
police] have no relationship to the concerns of the Confrontation Clause and a system 
that uses them as a dividing line for coverage would be absolutely ahistoric” and 
illogical because “the states’ treatment of this crime is far from uniform.”). 
141  Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2277. 
142  Id. at 2282–83 n.5. 
143 Id. at 2278. See Robert P. Mosteller, Softening the Formality and Formalism 
of the Testimonial Statement Concept, 19 REGENT L. REV. 429, 438–39 (that lies are 
crimes equaling formality is “curious,” “bizarre” and “inexplicable,” coming “largely 
out of the blue” with the potential of providing a significant limitation on the scope of 
testimonial statements). 
144   See Mosteller, supra note 143, at 445–46. 
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interrogation-produced statements.145 Unless abandoned or made less 
stringent, however, formality may prove an insurmountable obstacle to 
deciding that accusatory statements to private individuals are 
nontestimonial. 
 
*   *   * 
 
Given the formality discussion and the Hammon holding in Davis, 
Professor Richard Freidman concludes that there is no rule that the 
testimonial nature of a statement turns on its formal nature.146   
 Moreover, even if there is a formality requirement, Professor 
Friedman is satisfied by a showing that it would be objectively 
apparent to a reasonable person that the interrogation was being held 
for prosecutorial purposes.147 
Law Enforcement Reports and Expert Testimony Based upon a 
Testimonial Statement Disclosed to the Jury 
In Crawford, Justice Scalia declared that business records, “by 
their nature, were not testimonial.”148 Neither the Crawford nor Davis 
majority opinions make any reference to public records or reports.149  
True, some governmental records and reports may be akin to the 
nontestimonial private business records. On the other hand, some 
modern day governmental reports that are created for evidentiary  
purposes—e.g. DNA, fingerprints, blood alcohol level, ballistics, 
chemical composition and weight of substances—are a far cry, if not a 
completely separate and distinct species, from nontestimonial private 
business records of 1791. 
                                                          
145 Id. at 434 (Davis “clearly eliminated some of the extreme readings of 
formality and generally softened the requirement”). 
146 Friedman, supra note 74, at 571. 
147 Id. 
148 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004). Justice Scalia also 
concludes that, at the time of the Framing, there was a hearsay exception for business 
records. Id. But see Davies, supra note 29, at 365–66 (questions the existence of any 
such exception during the Framing-Era). 
149 But see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 76 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (noting with approval the 
majority’s nontestimonial characterization of business and “official” records). 
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These governmental reports, and the scientific tests and techniques 
that produce their findings and results, also bear little, if any, kinship 
or resemblance to statements of witnesses and accomplices secured by 
the civil law modes of criminal prosecution. Moreover, they are not 
produced by police interrogation.  
Still, both Crawford and Davis leave no doubt that there are other 
subcategories of testimonial evidence than the few mentioned in the 
two opinions.150 Also, Crawford cautioned that “[i]nvolvement of 
government officers in the production of testimony with an eye toward  
trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse.”151  Further, 
Davis warned that “restricting the Confrontation Clause to the precise 
forms against which it was originally directed is a recipe for its 
extinction.”152 
In her symposium article, U.C.L.A. Professor Jennifer Mnookin 
addresses Crawford’s impact on the admissibility of expert evidence in 
two recurring settings.153  She first discusses the introduction of 
written forensic reports without the live testimony of a report’s 
preparer.154 Second, she examines situations in which a testifying 
expert seeks to disclose hearsay of other individuals155 upon which the 
testifying expert has relied in reaching his or her conclusion.156 
At the outset of her article, Professor Mnookin notes that “while 
Davis does not . . . speak directly to the question of expert evidence 
under Crawford, its turn to a ‘primary purpose test’ may influence 
how courts assess whether laboratory reports and matters upon which 
experts rely are testimonial.”157 She also explains why characterizing 
such reports as business records does not, automatically, resolve the  
                                                          
150 Id. at 68; Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2273 (2006). 
151 541 U.S. at 56 n.7; see also id. at 53 (expressing concern about the risk 
posed by “the involvement of government officers in the production of testimonial 
evidence”). 
152 126 S.Ct at 2278 n.5. 
153 Jennifer Mnookin, Expert Evidence and the Confrontation Clause After 
Crawford v. Washington, 15 J.L. & POL’Y at 791, 797 (2007). 
154 Id. at 797–801. 
155 Id. at 800. 
156 Id. at 865–69. 
157 Id. at 793–94 n.10. See also GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 458 (Foundation 
Press Supp. 2006–07). 
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testimonial issue.158  
As for the testimonial nature of forensic reports or laboratory test 
results (in some jurisdictions called certificates of analysis), she 
concludes—after a thorough examination of the arguments on both 
sides—that most of these reports are testimonial in nature, requiring 
the previously uncross-examined preparer to testify at trial.159  She 
acknowledges, however, that the “great majority of courts analyzing 
expert disclosure issues . . . by hook or by crook, [are] holding that 
these [reports and] disclosures are not testimonial.”160 
As for the situation in which a testifying expert seeks to support 
his or her opinion by disclosing a testimonial statement of another 
expert or non-expert, Professor Mnookin concludes that the value of 
these out-of-court statements rests in the truth of the facts asserted in 
them. Thus, she concludes, disclosing such statements to the trier of 
fact violates the Confrontation Clause. Again, with one notable New 
York exception, she expresses disappointment over the decisions.161   
In the final part of her article, Professor Mnookin recognizes 
certain situations in which there is a genuine need for the admissibility 
of a testimonial report, and she offers some suggestions seeking to 
balance that need against the goals and purposes of Crawford.162  
Included among these suggestions is that perhaps in certain settings, 
the immutability of the Crawford principles should be modified.163 
Nontestimonial Statements 
Crawford offered both general and specific examples of 
nontestimonial statements, such as business records,164 statements in 
furtherance of a conspiracy,165 off-hand overheard remarks,166 casual  
                                                          
158 Mnookin, supra note 153, at 794, 829–32. 
159 See id. at 806; see generally, id at 809–842.   
160 Id. at 843. 
161 Id. at 823–25 (citing People v. Goldstein, 6 N.Y.3d 119, 843 N.E.2d 727 
(2005)). 
162 Id. at 858–62. 
163 Id. at 860. 
164 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004). 
165 Id.  
166 Id. at 51. 
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remarks to an acquaintance,167 statements by one prisoner to another 
blaming defendant for his incarceration,168 and statements made 
unwittingly to an FBI informant.169 
The majority opinion was a study in deliberate ambiguity as to 
whether the Confrontation Clause is exclusively concerned with 
testimonial statements or if it encompasses nontestimonial hearsay as 
well.170  Given this ambiguity, most state and federal courts had 
concluded that the admissibility of nontestimonial hearsay statements is 
still governed by the Ohio v. Roberts indicia of reliability 
framework.171 
Subsequently in Davis, after noting that it had not been necessary 
to resolve the question in Crawford, Justice Scalia stated: “We must 
decide, therefore, whether the Confrontation Clause applies only to 
testimonial hearsay.”172  In so doing, he sought to put the final nail in  
                                                          
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 57, (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87-89 (1970)); accord Davis 
v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2775 (2006). 
169 541 U.S. at 58 (citing Bourjailly v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181–84 
[1987]); accord Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2275. 
170 Compare Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 (“Even if the Sixth Amendment is not 
solely concerned with testimonial hearsay, that is its primary object. . . .”), with id. 
at 68 (“Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the 
Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law–as 
does [Ohio v.] Roberts and as would an approach that exempted such statements from 
Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.”). Compare id. at 50 (“This [testimonial] 
focus also suggests that not all hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment’s core 
concerns. An off-hand, overheard remark might be unreliable evidence and thus a 
good candidate for exclusion under hearsay rules, but it bears little resemblance to the 
civil-law abuses the Confrontation Clause targeted.”), with id. at 51 (“An accuser 
who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that 
a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.”); see 541 U.S. at 
61 (while the analysis in Crawford casts doubt on Confrontation Clause protection for 
nontestimonial statements, there is no need to definitively resolve the issue because 
Sylvia Crawford’s statement is testimonial under any definition). Chief Justice 
Rehnquist had no doubt that the Crawford majority “choosing the path it [did] of 
course overturned Roberts.”  541 U.S. at 75. 
171 See, e.g., United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 358 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 227 (2d Cir. 2004), cert denied, 543 U.S. 
1079, 125 S.Ct. 938 (2005); State v. Manuel, 697 N.W.2d 811, 814–28 (Wis. 2005). 
172 Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2274 (2006). 
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the coffin.173 Despite the relative clarity of the opinion,174 some state  
and federal courts still use the Roberts framework to test the 
admissibility of nontestimonial statements.175 
Finally, in Whorton v. Bockting, an unanimous Court held that 
Crawford was not a “watershed decision implicating fundamental 
fairness and accuracy,” and thus undeserving of retroactive application 
in a collateral proceeding.176 In that opinion, Justice Alito, for a 
unanimous Court, nailed the Roberts coffin shut.177 
 
*   *   * 
 
                                                          
173 See id. at 2273 (“It is the testimonial character of the statement that separates 
it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay 
evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.”); id. (“Only [testimonial] 
statements . . .  cause the declarant to be a ‘witness’ within the meaning of the 
Confrontation Clause.”); id. at 2274 (“A [testimonial] limitation so clearly reflected in 
the text of the [Sixth Amendment] must fairly be said to mark out not merely its 
‘core,’ but its perimeter.”). See also 126 S.Ct. at 2275 n.4 (“We overruled Roberts in 
Crawford by restoring the unavailability and cross-examination requirements.”); 126 
S.Ct. at 2280 (“Crawford, in overruling Roberts, did not destroy the ability of courts 
to protect the integrity of their proceedings” via the forfeiture doctrine). 
174  But see James J. Duane, The Cryptographic Coroner’s Report on Ohio v. 
Roberts, 2006 Fall CRIM. JUST. 37, 37–38 (2006) (Justice Scalia’s statement of 
overruling, “like the Da Vinci code, was one you have to look quite closely to 
find. . . . It is hard to imagine how [overruling Roberts] could have possibly been 
announced any more subtly or indirectly without using some foreign language.”). 
175 See, e.g., Middleton v. Roper, 455 F.3d 838, 857–58 n.6 (8th Cir. 2006); 
State v. Blue, 717 N.W.2d 558, 565 (N.D. 2006).  Within two weeks of each other, 
two panels of the Seventh Circuit, with one judge in common, reached sort of 
different conclusions. Compare United States v. Thomas, 453 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 
2006) (nontestimonial statements, which continue to be evaluated under Ohio v. 
Roberts, implicate the confrontation right), with United States v. Tolliver, 454 F.3d 
660, 665 n.2 (7th Cir. 2006) (Davis “appears” to have held that nontestimonial 
statements are not subject to the Confrontation Clause). 
176 127 S.Ct. 1173, 1182–89 (2007). 
177 Id. (“Crawford overruled Roberts because Roberts was inconsistent with the 
original understanding of the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. . . . Under 
Crawford, . . . the Confrontation Clause has no application to [out-of-court 
nontestimonial] statements and therefore permits their admission even if they lack 
indicia of reliability.”). As seen from the text in note 170, supra, Crawford did not 
overrule Roberts with respect to protection for unreliable nontestimonial statements. 
See Mosteller, supra note 18, at 700 n.56. 
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In his symposium article, Duke University Professor Robert 
Mosteller mourns the loss of Confrontation Clause protection provided 
by Roberts for unreliable nontestimonial accusatory hearsay 
statements.178 In particular, he points to the Court’s holding in Idaho 
v. Wright that the Confrontation Clause had been violated by the 
introduction at trial of a young child’s accusatory statements that had 
been elicited by the leading question of a pediatrician, and which were 
not otherwise supported by the Roberts required particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness.179 
Professor Mosteller argues problematic hearsay of this ilk is on 
the periphery of the confrontation right, presenting a “functionally 
related” problem that ought to lend itself to Confrontation Clause 
protection, even if not as complete as that required for core violations. 
In support of his argument, inter alia, he points to other areas of 
constitutional criminal procedure in which additional types of 
protections have been guaranteed,180 the historical relationship between 
confrontation and hearsay,181 the ambiguities of the Raleigh trial 
involving three different hearsay kinds of statements,182 and the 
difficulty and uncertainty of translating history, channeling the 
Framers, and applying it all in a modern context.183  
Professor Mosteller acknowledges that with Roberts’ demise, 
constitutional protection against problematic nontestimonial hearsay  
                                                          
178 Mosteller, supra note 18, 15 J.L. & POL’Y at 686. Of course, Professor 
Mosteller would be more than satisfied if the Court brought unreliable accusatory 
statements to private individuals under the testimonial umbrella, but he is doubtful the 
Court will do so. See Mosteller, supra note 117, at 948. The testimonial nature of 
such statements is considered in the text accompanying notes 108–34, supra. 
179  497 U.S. 805, 818–25 (1990). The decision in Wright is notable by the 
Crawford majority’s failure to discuss or even mention it. See Introduction, supra note 
18, at 1, 3–4 n.11. The confrontation violation in Wright might also be present under 
Crawford because there was evidence in the record that the pediatrician was acting at 
the behest of the police, and the child has spent the night before the interview in 
police custody. See Margaret A. Berger, DeConstitutionalization of the Confrontation 
Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 603–
04 (1992). 
180 Mosteller, supra note 18, at 701−02.  
181 Id. at 701–03. 
182 Id. at 712–18 (Cobham’s ex parte examination and letters to the Privy 
Council, and the trial testimony of an ocean pilot describing a Lisbon conversation 
with a Portuguese gentleman, discussed in note 18, supra). 
183 Id. at 19–22. 
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statements must find another home.184 That new home may be the Due 
Process Clause, which, unlike the Confrontation Clause, is concerned 
with the reliability of evidence.185 Whether a hearsay statement is 
within a firmly-rooted hearsay exception has no relevance in a due 
process reliability inquiry.186 
Forfeiture 
In dictum, Crawford accepted “the rule of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing [which] extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially 
equitable grounds.”187  In Davis, the Court reiterated that 
acceptance.188 
As noted earlier, Davis rejected a more flexible testimonial 
standard for statements made by domestic violence victims.189 Lower 
courts, however, may well be more responsive to greater flexibility 
with regard to forfeiture in the domestic violence setting, given the 
invitation to do so by Davis: domestic violence crimes are 
“notoriously susceptible to intimidation or coercion of the victim to  
                                                          
184 See id. at 723. 
185 See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 187 n.20 (1970) (Harlan, J. 
concurring) (“Due process does not permit a conviction . . . on . . . [hearsay] 
evidence so unreliable and untrustworthy that it may be said that the accused had been 
tried by a kangaroo court. . . . [W]here the prosecution’s entire case is built upon 
hearsay testimony of an unavailable witness . . . the defendant would be entitled to a 
hearing on the reliability of the testimony.”); White, 502 U.S. at 363–64 (Thomas, J. 
concurring) (reliability of hearsay “is more properly a due process than a 
confrontation concern.”). See Andrew Z. Teslitz, What Remains of Reliability: 
Hearsay and Freestanding Due Process After Crawford v. Washington, 20 CRIM. 
JUST. 39, 54 (Summer 2005) (post-Crawford assurance of reliability is embraced by 
free standing Due Process, i.e. not encompassed by a specific provision of the Bill of 
Rights). See generally Jerrold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal 
Procedure: The Supreme Court’s Search for Interpretive Guidlines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 303, 397 (2001) (Supreme Court free-standing due process rulings “tend to focus 
on the value of adjudicatory fairness [looking primarily to protect against the 
conviction of the innocent].”). 
186 Teslitz, supra note 185, at 49. 
187 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158–
59 (1897)). 
188 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2280 (2006). 
189 Id. 
PITLER INTRO.DOC 9/13/2007  10:40 AM 
347a JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
 
ensure that she does not testify at trial.”190 The opinion continued: 
“when defendants seek to undermine the judicial process by procuring 
or coercing silence from witnesses and victims, the Sixth Amendment 
does not require courts to acquiesce.”191 
In related dicta, the Court touched upon procedural aspects of 
forfeiture. Thus, while “tak[ing] no position on the standards 
necessary to demonstrate such forfeiture,”192 Davis went out of its way 
to note that “ . . . federal courts using Federal Rule of Evidence 
804(b)(6), which codifies the forfeiture doctrine,193 have generally 
held the Government to the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard 
[and] [s]tate courts tend to follow the same practice.”194  Moreover, 
the advisory and dicta-prone majority noted that if a hearing on 
forfeiture is required, “hearsay evidence, including the unavailable 
witness’s out-of-court statements, may be considered.”195 
 
*   *   * 
 
In his article, University of South Carolina Professor James 
Flanagan’s primary argument is that forfeiture by wrongdoing, which 
he believes should instead be called “waiver by misconduct,” should 
not occur without the defendant’s intent to cause a witness’s 
unavailability.196  Professor Flanagan acknowledges that Crawford’s  
                                                          
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 2279–80. 
192 Id. at 2280. 
193 On its face, FRE 804(b)(6) requires an intent to prevent a witness from 
testifying as an element of forfeiture. Post Davis, whether constitutional forfeiture 
requires that same intent has divided the courts. Compare, e.g., State v. Mason, 162 
P.3d 396, 404 (Wash. 2007) (no intent required), with People v. Moreno, 160 P.3d 
243, 245–47 (Colo. 2007) (intent required).  See also People v. Stechly, 870 N.E.2d 
333, 350–52, 353 (Ill. 2007) (requiring an intent but noting that there may be an 
exception in homicide cases) (authorities on both sides collected). 
194 Davis, 126 S.Ct at 2280 (emphasis supplied and citation omitted).  But see 
Davis, 162 P.3d at 404 (requiring clear and convincing evidence establishing that the 
accused’s wrongdoing has caused the unavailability of the declarant); People v. 
Geraci, 85 N.Y.2d 359, 367, 649 N.E.2d 817 (1995) (same). 
195 126 S.Ct. at 2280. 
196 James Flanagan, Foreshadowing the Future of Forfeiture/Estoppel by 
Wrongdoing: Davis v. Washington and the Necessity of the Defendant’s Intent to 
Intimidate the Witness, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 863, 864–65 (2007). 
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references to the doctrine of waiver as “forfeiture by wrongdoing” 
implied that intent was irrelevant and that confrontation rights could 
be terminated whenever the witness’s absence could be traced to the 
defendant’s wrongdoing.197  As a result, post-Crawford lower court 
decisions expanded the doctrine far beyond prior precedent and 
history.198 
The Davis opinion corrected this misimpression, concludes 
Professor Flanagan, when it “all but stat[ed] that the estoppel doctrine 
is limited to witness-tampering cases.”199  Professor Flanagan also 
notes that Justice Scalia’s use of such words as “procure” and 
“coerce” with regard to silencing witnesses describes “purposeful 
acts” on the part of the defendant, as does the reference to 
interference with the “judicial process.”200  Professor Flanagan 
concludes: “Davis seems to have clearly adopted the intent to prevent 
testimony element.”201 
Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer focuses on the need to 
reconceptualize the forfeiture doctrine as it applies to domestic 
violence cases and their hallmark abusive relationships.202  In many of 
those cases, she points out, the abuse that rendered the victim 
unavailable had occurred even before the crime charged was 
committed.203  Consequently, there is an absence of traditional witness 
tampering and the abuse involved is not always identified as 
misconduct.  Accordingly, she reasons that to properly address 
forfeiture principles in domestic violence settings, courts must 
recognize and acknowledge patterns of violence and abuse. In this 
regard, Professor Tuerkheimer emphasizes the crucial need to consider 
the relationship between the abusing defendant and the abused victim 
in determining whether the defendant has caused the  victim  to  be  
                                                          
197 Id. at 874. 
198 Id. at 875–78. 
199 Id. at 878. 
200 Id. at 880–82. 
201 Id. at 887.  Professor Flanagan further argues that courts should require a 
“but for” causal connection between the defendant’s act and the witness’s 
unavailability, and he sets forth several reasons for a stronger causal relationship. Id. 
at 891. 
202 Tuerkheimer, supra note 60, at 746. 
203 Id. at 747. 
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unavailable.204  
Professor Myrna Raeder views an intent to prevent a person from 
testifying as not being required when that person has been murdered, 
but should be required in domestic violence cases when a domestic 
violence victim fails to appear at trial.205 Professor Raeder rejects the 
arguments that forfeiture should be presumed and that particularized 
evidence should be required to establish that the defendant caused the 
victim’s absence with the intent to prevent the victim from testifying.206 
She also notes that placing the burden on defendant to prove a lack of 
coercion or misconduct seems particularly unfair because of the 
inherent difficulties in proving a negative.207 Finally, Professor Raeder, 
like Professor Tuerkheimer, advocates for an expanded relevance 
standard with respect to forfeiture in domestic violence cases—
including evidence of abusive patterns, individual acts of abuse, prior 
charges of abuse, prior recantations by the victim, and evidence of 
post-traumatic stress disorder.208 
 
*   *   * 
 
 The above highlights of the articles from this symposium barely 
scratch the surface of the confrontation treasures in store for the 
reader. Also awaiting Crawford-philes is a seemingly endless flow of 
state and federal confrontation/hearsay decisions, at least a few of 
which will end up in the Supreme Court. Indeed this past June, a 
petition for certiorari was filed with respect to the testimonial nature of 
laboratory reports.209 Doubtless other cases will reach the Court, as it 
seeks, “in a process that will take decades,”210 to fashion a 
comprehensive Confrontation Clause Code of Evidence. Crawford and 
Beyond III et seq. will be waiting patiently in the wings. Put another 
way, “It ain’t over ‘till it’s over.”211 
                                                          
204 Id. at 748. 
205 Raeder, supra note 84, at 778–79. 
206 Id. at 780–81. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. 
209 Compare, State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663, 666 (Mo. 2007) (laboratory 
report that substance tested was cocaine prepared solely to be introduced at trial is 
“testimonial” as it bears all the characteristics of an ex parte affidavit) cert pet. 
pending No. 06-1699, sched. for conf. 9/24/07, with  Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 
N.E.2d 701, 705 (Mass. 2005) (public laboratory report identifying a tested substance 
as cocaine is a nontestimonial public record). 
210 Friedman, supra note 74, at 586. 
211 YOGI BERRA, supra  *, at 121. 
